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Abstract:  Zone pricing in wholesale gasoline markets is a contentious topic in the public policy 
debate. Refiners contend that they use zone pricing to be competitive with local rivals.   Critics 
claim that zone pricing benefits the oil industry and harms consumers.   With a controlled 
experiment, we investigate the competitive effects of zone pricing on consumers, retail stations, 
and refiners vis-à-vis the proposed policy prescription of uniform wholesale pricing to retailers.  
We also examine the issue of divorcement and the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon. The 
former is the legal restriction that refiners and retailers cannot be vertically integrated, and the 
latter is the perception that retail gasoline prices rise faster than they fall in response to random 
walk movements in the world price for oil. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Few industries evoke such strong sentiments by consumers, retailers, wholesalers, and 
policy makers as gasoline.  The structure of the gasoline industry is extremely complex, making 
the impact of common practices unclear and thus the focus of much public scrutiny.  The 
practice of zone pricing has been a particularly contentious topic in the public policy debate for 
the past several years.1  Zone pricing is the industry term to describe the practice of refiners 
setting different wholesale prices for retail gasoline stations that operate in different geographic 
areas or zones.  Refiners contend, as Chevron did, that they employ zone pricing to “price our 
wholesale gasoline to our dealers at prices that will allow them to be competitive.”2   However, 
state legislators and attorneys general propose legislation to ban zone pricing claiming that it 
“only benefits the oil industry, to the detriment of consumers.”3 
Another controversial issue that is debated in the gasoline industry is divorcement, the 
legal restriction that refiners and retailers cannot be vertically integrated.  Maryland was the first 
state to pass such legislation in 1974 with a handful of other states following suit.  A 2000 report 
from Bill Lockyer, the Attorney General for the State of California, states that “members of the 
Task Force believe the key to enhancing competition at the retail level is to eliminate vertical 
integration by petroleum companies (p. 33).”  However, in a prepared statement made before a 
subcommittee of the U.S. Senate, Hastings (2002a) testified that “Divorcement will not lead to 
lower prices, and may increase inefficiency (p. 7).”    
The objective of our study is to design an environment that captures the essential 
components of wholesale and retail gasoline markets and to use a controlled experiment to test 
these opposing viewpoints.  Within the confines of the laboratory, the impact of zone pricing and 
divorcement can be evaluated while holding the geographic markets, production and delivery 
costs, and the associated consumer demographics constant.4  Additionally, we can also preclude 
entry at the retail level, thus setting a condition most unfavorable to zone pricing in terms of its 
potential harm to consumers.  Experimental economics is an ideal tool for addressing zone 
                                                 
1 For example, Maryland set up The Governor’s Task Force on Gasoline Zone pricing in 2000.  The task force’s 
report in September of 2001 promotes a prohibition on zone pricing.  See Isaac, Oaxaca, and Reynolds (1998) for a 
detailed discussion of retail price differentials in Arizona. 
2 See Burtman (2000).  
3 See “Testimony of Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal Before the House Judiciary Committee,” 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/blum0407.htm, April 7, 2000. The California State Assembly recently considered 
banning zone pricing (see Douglas (2003)). 
4 Smith (1994) lists evaluation of policy proposals as one reason to conduct experiments.     
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pricing.  Currently, gasoline wholesalers are free, as Shepard (1993, p. 63) notes, to charge 
“station-specific” wholesale prices.  In an experiment, we can control the extent, if any, to which 
zone pricing can be employed in situations where explicit collusion among the wholesalers is not 
possible.  Allowing zone pricing in one treatment serves as a benchmark for evaluating the 
complementary treatment, banning zone pricing by mandating uniform wholesale prices.  Such a 
comparison affords a direct examination of the welfare effects of the proposed legislation on 
consumers, retailers, and wholesalers.  Similarly, we can vary the degree of vertical integration 
to assess the impact of divorcement. A chief advantage of a controlled laboratory study is that we 
can precisely measure buyer welfare, which cannot be done in naturally occurring gasoline 
markets because consumer preferences are not observable.  With an experiment we also have 
precise data on the actual transaction prices paid by consumers as opposed to just posted prices at 
retail stations.  
With our data set, we also explore the phenomenon that retail gasoline prices adjust 
asymmetrically to cost shocks, yet another topic that has led to much public outcry.  Several 
papers have found that gasoline prices rise more rapidly than they fall (see Johnson, 2002; Reilly 
and Witt, 1998; Borenstein et al., 1997; Castanias and Johnson, 1993; and Bacon, 1991).5 Even 
though the data suggest that the asymmetry is relatively short lived (see Johnson, 2002), when 
prices climb quickly, the popular press is filled with stories about price gouging, exploitation of 
market power and the possibility of collusion.  Of course, there are less pejorative explanations 
as well.  One such gasoline spike occurred in the Midwest during the spring of 2000.  Bulow, 
Fischer, Creswell, and Taylor (2003) study this period and determine that the price response was 
due to supply interruptions and argue against the possibility of collusive explanations.  Further, 
they conclude that such episodes are likely to occur with increasing frequency as more and more 
localities place constraints on gasoline blends.6    
Other explanations for asymmetric responses include inventory costs, menu costs, trigger 
pricing strategies, and consumer search costs (see Johnson 2002, Castanias and Johnson 1993 
and references therein).  Using weekly gasoline prices from Los Angeles between 1968 and 
                                                 
5 As Peltzman (2000) reports, this phenomenon is not unique to gasoline.  It thus remains unclear why consumers 
respond so strongly to changes in gasoline prices.  One potential explanation is that unlike other products, 
consumers process a large volume of gasoline price information daily even when they are not considering a purchase 
due to the prominence of posted pricing in this market.  Conspicuous price information for an extensively used 
product may make it easier for people to detect price changes when retailer cost changes are less obvious. 
6 The Midwest gas spike of 2000 centered on the implementation of a new standard for cleaner burning reformulated 
gasoline. 
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1971, Castanias and Johnson (1993) contend that the data closely match the predictions of 
Maskin and Tirole’s (1988) adjustment model.  Johnson (2002) argues that empirical data from 
the mid to late 1990s are consistent with a search cost model.  Our laboratory investigation 
provides direct empirical evidence on asymmetric price responses and their indicatives of 
anticompetitive behavior, while explicitly controlling factors such as buyer search and menu 
costs.7     
 
2. Industry Background 
The first step in the production and delivery of gasoline is the extraction of crude oil.   
Oil is then traded in a global market and transported to refineries.  At the refinery, oil is 
converted into gasoline and other products including diesel fuel, asphalt and jet fuel.  Gasoline is 
then piped to various distribution terminals.  In the U.S., these terminals are located throughout 
the country near most major metropolitan areas.  At this point in the process, gasoline is a pure 
commodity in that the supplier is indistinguishable and, in fact, pipe lines carry gasoline from 
multiple suppliers.  At the terminal, gasoline is collected in large holding tanks by the various 
wholesalers operating in the proximity.  At this point in the process brand specific additives are 
inserted.8  The price of gasoline from these holding facilities is referred to as the rack price.  The 
gasoline is then shipped by tanker truck to individual retail locations. 
Not only can consolidation change the number of competitors, it can also change the 
degree of vertical integration present in a given geographic market as there are several different 
contractual arrangements between retail outlets and refiners.  Branded stations must sell the 
specified brand of gasoline.  Some branded stations are company operated, meaning that the 
refiner owns the retail outlet and sets retail prices.  Alternatively, a branded station can be either 
a lessee dealer or a dealer owned station in which case the retail outlet sets the retail price but it 
is obligated to buy the refiner’s brand of gas. The difference between a lessee dealer and a dealer 
owned station pertains to the ownership of the retail facility.  The price of gasoline delivered to a 
station is referred to as a Dealer Tank Wagon (DTW) price.  In practice, refiners can engage in 
zone pricing by setting the DTW price to reflect market conditions in very specific geographic 
                                                 
7 Cason and Friedman (2002) and Cason, Friedman, and Milam (2003) also examine the price stickiness with respect 
to random walk shocks to cost, but they also impose switching costs on their human buyers in their laboratory 
markets. 
8 Unbranded gasoline is gasoline with no branded additives.  Special gasoline blends such as the CARB gasoline 
required for California are produced at the refinery.      
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locations, possibly as small as a single station.  Under these types of arrangements, the stations 
can either be supplied directly by the refiner or can purchase gas from a branded jobber.  The 
term jobber refers to an intermediary that delivers gas from the rack to the retail location.9  A 
fourth category of retailer is the independent station.  Independent stations typically sell 
unbranded gasoline.  They are also free to set their own retail prices and can acquire gas directly 
from the terminal or via a jobber with the constraint that only a branded jobber can deliver 
branded gasoline.10 While a small percentage of independent stations are dealer supplied, most 
are supplied by jobbers.      
Hastings (2002b) uses ARCO’s acquisition of the independent chain Thrifty in southern 
California to examine the impact of a reduction in the number of non-integrated independent 
retailers in the market.11  She observes no retail price differential due to the new ARCO store 
being either a company operated or dealer operated station.  This finding argues against the 
divorcement proposals issued by several communities that would force wholesalers and retailers 
of branded gasoline to be separate.  In the event that the retailers have market power,12 forcing 
retailers to be independent of the wholesaler could lead to a double marginalization problem, 
resulting in higher retail prices for non-integrated outlets.  Barron and Umbeck (1984) and Vita 
(2000) provide support for this hypothesis.   
Given the complexity of the gasoline industry and the incompleteness of naturally 
occurring field data, it is not surprising that there is ambiguity about the effects of certain 
actions.  The laboratory provides an environment in which factors such as buyer preferences and 
search patterns can be held constant.  By exogenously manipulating the strategic capabilities of 
wholesalers, policies such as zone pricing and divorcement can be directly evaluated.  Further, in 
the laboratory direct evidence can be gathered about responsiveness of the retail prices to supply 
shocks including changes in crude oil prices and the impact of changes in the number or 
composition of competitors.  Beyond profits and retail prices, laboratory studies can also 
                                                 
9 Like refiners, jobbers can also set station-specific prices. 
10 During rack inversions, a situation in which branded rack prices are below unbranded rack prices, wholesalers of 
branded gasoline can place limits on the quantity jobbers acquire at the terminal effectively preventing independent 
stations from acquiring the cheaper branded gasoline. In addition, in times of shortages, unbranded stations are 
typically supplied last. 
11 Hastings (2002b) also investigates the impact of a reduction in the overall number of competitors but concludes 
that the elimination of a competitor is not responsible for the observed 5 cents per gallon price increase.    
12 Hastings (2002b, p. 6) notes that “Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997), Borenstein and Shepard (1996), and 
Slade (1992) provide empirical evidence consistent with local retail market power.”    
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evaluate social welfare which is not possible in the field as data are not available as to the value 
consumers receive from purchasing gasoline.            
 
3. A Vertical Model of Gasoline Markets 
Our model of the gasoline industry consists of N refiners who compete to sell branded13 
gasoline to R gasoline retailers,14 who in turn compete to sell gasoline to final consumers.  Only 
refiner i can sell its branded gasoline bi.  The cost per unit to refiner i for supplying gasoline of 
type bi is ci.  Based upon the types of contracts that exist in the retail gasoline market, each retail 
station is constrained to sell a specific brand of gasoline at an exogenously determined location 
on a grid.  The location of outlet ρ is given by an integer pair, (s, a) where s ∈ {1, 2,…, S} and a 
∈ {1, 2,…, A}.  Thus each station r bas i),,(ρ is indexed by location, brand, and retailer identity r 
∈ R.  Note that identifying the location and the retailer is not redundant as multiple outlets can 
operate at the same location.  It is quite common for two stations to be located on opposite sides 
of the street at the same intersection.  Further, the retailer identity and the brand type are not 
redundant as there could be multiple retailers selling the same brand, as would occur in a market 
with both company operated and lessee dealer stations.  The per unit price charged to a consumer 
by a retail outlet is r
ibas
p
),,(ρ
.   
Each buyer has a value v for one unit of gasoline.  Buyers in the market are characterized 
by brand preference and location.  A fraction 
ib
ω of the buyers have a preference for brand bi, 
meaning that these buyers gain additional utility 0>
ib
β if they consume brand bi.  The fraction 
of consumers who do not have a brand preference is defined as 
0b
ω with ∑
=
−=
N
n
bb n
1
1
0
ωω .  For 
customers with no brand preference we define 0
0
≡bβ .  To distinguish the location of a 
consumer from the location of a retailer, the buyer’s location is denoted by the pair (σ, α) where 
σ ∈ {1, 2,…, S} and α ∈ {1, 2,…, A}.  The percentage of buyers at a particular location is 
determined by the density function )(⋅f  defined over the S × A possible locations 
                                                 
13 As the primary focus of this paper is on zone pricing, divorcement, and asymmetric price responses, the 
environment is simplified by only considering branded gasoline.  The impact of branded versus unbranded gasoline 
is beyond the scope of this paper.    
14 R and r are used to denote retail level players and the Greek versions, Ρ and ρ of these letters denote the retail 
outlets.  These groups are not isomorphic as a retailer can operate multiple outlets.   
 
 6
with 1),( =ΣΣ asf
as
.  Buyers incur a travel cost )(⋅d  which is increasing and convex in the 
distance traveled.  In this model, distance is defined by the norm 
ασασ −+−=) asas ),(,,( which gives the number intersections a buyer located at (σ, α) 
must travel to reach the retail station r bas i),,(ρ .
15   
In naturally occurring economies, gasoline retailers must first acquire inventory from the 
refiner before selling the gasoline to the consumer.  This sequencing puts the refiners that are not 
vertically integrated in a theoretically advantageous position relative to their stations, but 
generates the typical double marginalization problem.  In the downstream market, retailers 
maximize their profits conditioned on upstream prices.  The upstream refiners are able to 
incorporate retailer reaction when setting DTW prices.16   
A buyer with a preference for brand j attempts to  
)),(,a(s,( max
),,(),,(
),,(
ασβς
ρρ
ρ
)−−+
∈
dpv r
ibasj
r
ibasr
ibas
bj
P
 
subject to 0)),(,a(s,(
),,(),,(
≥)−−+ ασβς
ρρ
dpv r
ibasj
r
ibas
bj
 
where ρς j is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if station 
r
bas i),,(
ρ  sells brand j and is 0 
otherwise.17  The problem is similar for buyers with no brand preference.  If the consumer cannot 
achieve a nonnegative utility from buying from any retailer, then the consumer does not purchase 
gasoline and receives a utility of 0.  In the event that two stations offer the same total utility to a 
buyer, a buyer with a preference for bi selects an outlet selling this brand over an outlet selling 
any other brand.  Otherwise such ties are broken randomly.  
In this industry, gasoline is delivered to retailers by tanker trucks.  The retailer then holds 
this gasoline in its inventory and sells the product to consumers over some period of time.  To 
incorporate this into the model, we suppose that when a retailer sells out of gasoline, a tanker 
delivers K units of gasoline at a per unit price determined as described above.  Each period, one 
                                                 
15 As the retailers and consumers are located on a grid, this taxi cab metric provides a more natural notion of 
distance than does the standard Euclidian metric. 
16  In what follows we use the terms wholesale price and DTW price interchangeably. 
17 To include search costs, the buyer’s problem becomes one of maximizing expected benefits net of search costs 
based upon the buyer’s beliefs about the distribution of prices.  Again, as the primary focus of this paper is on zone 
pricing, divorcement, and asymmetric price responses, we simplify the environment by not incorporating search 
costs.  
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buyer enters the market at a randomly chosen location and considers purchasing a single unit of 
gasoline.  A retailer only refills its tanks once it sells K units. 
The retailer’s problem is to set prices at the retail outlets it operates so as to maximize its 
expected profit.  Let r
ibas
w
),,(ρ
denote the per unit price charged by refiner i to a retail outlet r bas i),,(ρ  
for gasoline of type i.  In addition to the cost of gasoline, a retailer incurs an additional cost of 
r
ibas
e
),,(ρ
.18  This cost is interpretable as an effort cost or as the cost associated with operating 
service bays or convenience stores.  Refiner i’s problem is to set r
ibas
w
),,(ρ
for all r bas i),,(ρ ∈ Ρ to 
maximize profits.  The equilibrium solution is a set of optimal prices for the refiners and the 
retailers.  This environment and institution, however, are too complex to identify any equilibria, 
either analytically or numerically.  In the next section, we will provide two reference predictions, 
one analytical and one numerical.  The former is the competitive or surplus-maximizing price, 
and the latter the joint profit-maximizing or monopoly prices.   
 Before discussing our experimental design we briefly comment on the objective of this 
section.  This section constructs an environment and institution of wholesale and retail gasoline 
markets that captures the essential features of naturally occurring markets.  In particular, we 
chose those elements (agents, variables, and actions) that are necessary to generate data to 
address the questions posed in Sections 1 and 2.  Our methodological objective for the 
experiment on which the model is based is heuristic or exploratory in nature (Smith, 1982), and 
hence we are more interested in the richness of the strategic interactions in these markets than in 
sharply defined predictions of a model.  If out of this complexity emerges a distinct order of 
outcomes in the experiment, more formal theoretical models would play a critical role in 
summarizing the statement of the observed behavioral regularities. But that is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
 
4. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 Our laboratory gasoline markets consist of N = 4 refiners that each produce branded 
gasoline and R = 4 retailers who each operate 2 locations on a 7 × 7 grid. To the subjects, each 
                                                 
18 For simplicity, the role of the jobber has been suppressed in this model.  The price charged by each retailer can be 
considered to include delivery or this additional cost could be thought of as a separate jobber fee.   
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brand is distinguished by its color: b1 = blue, b2 = pink, b3 = green, and b4 = red.  Figure 1 depicts 
the location and brand for each retail station.19   
Buyers are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the grid,
49
1),( =asf .  Further, the 
likelihood that a buyer prefers brand i is 20.0=
ib
ω  and the benefit a buyer who prefers brand i 
received from purchasing it is 25=
ib
β .  As each buyer has an inelastic demand for 1 unit valued 
at v = 240 and has an insignificant impact upon the market, truthfully revealing robots serve as 
the final consumers.  With the market shown in Figure 1, there is a “center” area at (s, a) = (4, 4) 
where each of the four branded retailers are “clustered”.  Each retailer also operates an outlet in a 
relatively “isolated” area in the “corner” of the grid.  These two types of areas are meant to 
address the claim of refiners that they use zone pricing to be competitive with their local rivals.20    
The cost of traveling is 24)( xxd = for x = 0, 1, …, 12.  Given that 265=+ v
ib
β , no 
consumer is willing to travel further than 8 blocks to purchase gasoline and would only be 
willing to travel 7 intersections to a non-preferred brand outlet.  The buyers have complete 
information about current retail prices.21  Each laboratory session lasts 1200 periods.  In each 
period, which is every 1.7 seconds, a robot buyer from a randomly drawn location enters the 
market, observes retail prices and makes a purchase decision.  Given the complexity of this 
market, we chose to implement a video game-like environment to capture the attention of the 
subjects but also to allow them try many different strategies. Traditional posted price 
experiments with one to two minute periods may allow subjects more time to ponder a decision, 
but they also take much longer in order to generate feedback for the subject.22  Unsolicited 
feedback from the subjects indicated that they very much enjoyed the experiment and their eyes 
appeared never to wander from the screen. 
 We consider three experimental treatments to identify the impact of banning zone pricing 
and limiting vertical integration in retail gasoline markets.  In the zone pricing (or baseline) 
treatment, refiners have the ability to set r
ibas
w
),,(ρ
 for each r bas i),,(ρ ∈ Ρ, as described in the 
preceding section.  In this treatment, each retailer observes two location specific wholesale prices 
                                                 
19 The information was presented graphically to the subjects. 
20 See footnote 2. 
21 This assumption could be relaxed; however, a priori one would expect that search costs could have the same price 
increasing effect in both the zone pricing and the uniform pricing treatments. 
22 See Davis and Korenok (2005) for a discussion of period length in posted offer markets.   
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but could not shift inventory between locations.23  We will compare this treatment to our uniform 
pricing treatment in which legislation bans zone pricing.  In terms of the model described above, 
the uniform pricing treatment imposes the restriction that iww r
ibas
=
),,(ρ
for every station selling bi.  
It is important to note that uniform pricing at the wholesale level does not imply uniform retail 
prices.  In both the zone pricing and uniform pricing treatments, refiners are able to change 
wholesale prices throughout the 1200 periods.  We measure the effects of divorcement by 
comparing the baseline treatment with a company operated (company-op) treatment.  In the 
company-op treatment all of the retail stations are vertically integrated, which essentially 
removes the intermediary and eliminates double marginalization.  This is operationalized by 
automatically setting r
ibas
w
),,(ρ
= ci.24  In all three treatments, the non-gasoline expenses of each 
retailer are 10
),,(
=r
ibas
e
ρ
.               
For the first 600 periods, ic
ib
∀=  100 .  In the remaining 600 periods, the refiners’ costs 
follow a random walk to simulate changes in price for crude oil on the world market. The 
stochastic shocks are distributed as N(0, 15). The number of periods until the next permanent 
shock is distributed as U[20, 35].  This means that the refiners’ costs change every 34 to 60 
seconds.  The subjects are not given this information on the nature of the cost shocks.  To reduce 
intersession variation, we hold the set of cost realizations constant across all sessions. 
 Retailer r sets r
ibas
p
),,(ρ
 and could adjust this price at any time during the 1200 periods.  
Retailers and refiners observe all current retail prices including those set by rival outlets.  
However, the current DTW prices are known only by the refiner and the associated retailer.  At 
the beginning of sessions  in the zone and uniform treatments, refiners set initial wholesale 
prices, which the branded retailers are forced to accept for the initial inventory of K = 10 units.  
Once a location stocks out, the retailer completely replenishes its inventory of K = 10 units at the 
current wholesale price.  In the event that wholesale prices fall, it is possible that a retail outlet 
has gas in its inventory that cost more than current rival retail prices.  To avoid the retailer 
having to fully absorb losses, the refiners can offer rebates to the retailers for unsold units in 
inventory.                  
                                                 
23 Generally, stations are contractually prohibited from shifting inventory in natural contexts. 
24 The price setting role of the refiner is eliminated in the company-op treatment and hence no subjects are placed in 
the role of refiner in these sessions.    
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 One potential reference prediction for all three treatments is the competitive outcome, 
cp = =+ r
ibas
r
ibas
ew
),,(),,( ρρ
100 + 10 = 110 ibasr ,,,∀  (for the first 600 periods). However, no pure 
strategy equilibrium at any price exists in the stage game because for 20.0=
ib
ω > 0, r
ibas
p
),,(ρ
= 
110 +
ib
β = 110 + 25 = 135 strictly dominates the competitive price (i.e., with positive probability 
a brand loyal buyer is willing to purchase a unit at a positive profit for the retailer).  Given the 
repeated nature of this game and the unknown time horizon, a second potential reference 
prediction is joint profit-maximizing prices mcenterp and
m
cornerp at the center and corner stations, 
respectively.  Using a numerical grid search, the expected joint profit-maximizing prices are 
m
centerp = 229 and 
m
cornerp = 224.
25  
We conducted a total of twelve laboratory sessions, four in each treatment.  Each session 
lasted no longer than 90 minutes and consisted of 8 subjects in the zone and uniform treatments 
and 4 subjects in the company-op treatment, who were recruited from undergraduate classes in 
economics, management, and engineering at George Mason University.  In each session subjects 
were randomly assigned a role.26  Prior to beginning the actual experiment, subjects were given 
ample opportunity to ask questions.  Each subject only participated in one session and received 
US$1 for every 800 of experimental profit.  The average payoff across all subjects was $18.25, 
including $5 for showing up on time.  The total surplus possible in each session was over 
US$800.  Subjects received their payments in private at the conclusion of the session. 
 
5. Experiment Findings 
In what follows we present the results of our experiment as a series of nine findings.  We 
break down the discussion of the results into two subsections. The first subsection covers the 
                                                 
25 At a center price of 229, a center station will sell to any branded buyer within two blocks, any branded buyer three 
blocks away that is also not one block away from a corner station, and any unbranded person within one block of the 
center.  For the corner prices of 224, corner stations will sell to any unbranded buyer within two blocks, a branded 
buyer within two blocks that is more than two blocks from the center stations, and a branded buyer that is two 
blocks away and also two away from the center but happens to prefer the brand at the corner.  Unbranded buyers at 
(1,4), (4,1), (4,7) and (7,4) do not buy at these monopoly prices. 
26 To avoid the potentially loaded terms associated with gasoline markets, the refiners and station owners were 
referred to as suppliers and store owners, respectively, who were buying and selling a fictitious product. A copy of 
the instructions is available from the authors upon request.  In an attempt to aid comprehension of the environment, 
prior to beginning the experiment, each subject experienced the opposite role for 300 periods (except in the 
company-op treatment for which there is only one role).  That is, a refiner (retailer) first read the instructions and 
participated as a retailer (refiner) for 300 periods, before reading the instructions as a refiner (retailer) and 
participating for 1200 periods as a refiner (retailer).  
 
 11
results from the first 600 periods with stable wholesale costs. We attempt to mitigate learning 
effects by focusing our attention on the last half these periods (301-600), though as we will 
discuss later, the main story is found in the competitive shakeout at the beginning of the session.  
For this set of periods we first estimate the comparative static effects of the zone and uniform 
pricing treatments and the location effect of corner and center stations.  Then we consider the 
effects of divorcement by estimating the comparative static effects of lessee dealers with zone 
pricing versus vertically integrated, company-owned stations.  The second subsection analyzes 
the dynamic adjustment of station prices when the wholesale costs are nonstationary in periods 
601-1200. 
 
5.1 Comparative Static Effects with Constant Wholesale Costs 
5.1.1 Zone versus Uniform Pricing 
As an introduction, consider the following qualitative summary.  As permitted in the zone 
pricing treatment, refiners clearly and endogenously adopt zone pricing to the retail stations.  The 
average wholesale price to the corner stations is 174 versus 147 to the center stations.  When the 
refiners are forced to charge uniform prices, the average wholesale price is 151, but it is unclear 
how meaningful this average is considering that there is a large variation in refiner prices across 
and within sessions.  Wholesale prices in two of the uniform pricing sessions are as high as the 
average corner station wholesale prices under zone pricing.  In another uniform pricing session, 
wholesale prices are approximately equal to average center wholesale prices under zone pricing.  
Average wholesale prices in the remaining uniform pricing session are below the average center 
wholesale prices with zone pricing.   
Figure 2, which contains histograms of all of the posted retail prices, reveals that 
consumers do not see lower retail prices with uniform wholesale pricing.  The mode for the 
corner stations is 200 in both the zone and uniform treatments. The posted prices are slightly 
higher in the uniform treatment, as there is considerably more mass distributed across the 210-
230 bins in the uniform treatment.  The effect of a uniform pricing policy on retail prices is 
considerably more striking at the central stations.  The entire distribution of posted prices shifts 
to the right under uniform wholesale pricing.  The mode in the uniform treatment is 190, whereas 
the mode is only 150 with zone pricing. 
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We first assess the effect of zone and uniform pricing on the transaction prices in each 
market. Unlike field studies which rely on posted prices, our dataset contains the actual prices 
paid by each buyer.  The quantitative results are derived by analyzing the data with a linear 
mixed-effects model for repeated measures.  The treatment effect (Zone vs. Uniform wholesale 
pricing) and location effect (Center vs. Corner station) and an interaction effect are modeled as 
zero-one fixed effects, while the 8 independent sessions and the 4 subjects within each session 
are modeled as random effects, ei and irζ , respectively.  Specifically, we estimate the model 
tiriiiritir CornerUniformCornerUniformeicerP llll εβββζμ +×+++++= 321  , 
where ),0(~ 21σNei , ),0(~
2
2σζ Nir , and ),0(~
2
,3 itir N σε l .
27  The sessions are indexed by i; the 
subjects acting as retailers within each session are indexed by r = 1, 2, 3, 4; and the repeated 
periods are indexed by t (e.g., t = 301, 302, …, 600).  lCorner = 0 if l = (s, a) = (4, 4) and 1 
otherwise.  The dependent variable tiricerP l is the transaction price received by subject r in 
session i at station location l  in period t. We also accommodate heteroskedastic errors by 
session when estimating the model via maximum likelihood. 
Estimates of the treatment and location effects are easy to compute with this 
specification.  The intercept μ is the expected price in the zone pricing treatment at the center 
location, μ + β1 is the expected price in the uniform pricing treatment at a center location, μ + β2 
is the expected price in the zone pricing treatment at the corner location, and μ + β1 + β2 + β3 is 
the expected price in the uniform pricing treatment at a corner location. 
Finding 1:  Retail transaction prices are statistically higher in the isolated areas than in the 
clustered area.  Uniform pricing in the wholesale market increases retail transaction prices in 
the clustered area, but has no significant effect on transaction prices in the isolated areas.   
 
Evidence:  The mixed effects estimation results presented in Table 1 provide the quantitative 
support for this finding. The average retail transaction price with zone pricing at the wholesale 
level is μ̂   = 149.98 at a station in the clustered area and 2ˆˆ βμ +  = 191.58 in an isolated area, a 
27.7% increase.  This effect of location is highly significant ( 2β̂  = 41.60, p-value = 0.0000).  
                                                 
27 It is important to note that the linear mixed effects model for repeated measures treats each session as one degree 
of freedom with respect to the treatments.  Hence, with two treatment parameters, there are 6 degrees of freedom for 
the estimates of the treatment fixed effect (8 sessions – 2 parameters). See Longford (1993) for a description of this 
technique commonly employed in experimental sciences. 
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With uniform pricing in the wholesale market, the average retail transaction price is 1ˆˆ βμ +   = 
166.38 at a station in the center and 321 ˆˆˆˆ βββμ +++ =195.87 in the corner.  Again the effect of 
location is highly significant ( 32 ˆˆ ββ +  = 29.49, p-value=0.0000).  The uniform pricing treatment 
effect of 1β̂  = 16.40 at center stations is statistically significant (p-value = 0.0311) and nontrivial 
in economic terms—uniform pricing at the wholesale level increases retail transaction prices in 
the clustered area by 10.9%.  Transaction prices in the isolated stations are slightly higher with 
uniform pricing than with zone pricing ( 31 ˆˆ ββ +  = 4.29), but this effect is statistically 
insignificant (p-value = 0.4926).  
Given the data generated by our experiment we are able to determine that high retail 
prices in the isolated areas are not the result of high wholesale prices with zone pricing, but 
rather the cause of high wholesale prices.  Figure 3 plots average wholesale prices and average 
posted retail prices by location for the first 300 periods when subjects are learning about the 
competitive pressures or lack thereof.  Notice that wholesale prices to corner stations have a 
noticeable upward trend in the zone pricing treatment.  Over the first 100 periods, corner station 
retail prices are very high.  As the refiners recognize that these isolated stations are very 
profitable at those prices, the refiners use zone pricing to capture some of the rents from the 
corner stations.  The clustered area stands in rather marked contrast. As station prices tumble due 
to the competition, wholesale prices also fall as the refiners use zone pricing to be more 
competitive.  Only after station prices stabilize around period 250 do wholesale prices start to 
rise as refiners attempt to capture the retailer profits in the clustered area.  Ultimately, the 
refiners capture more of the profits with zone pricing, but not to the detriment of consumers. 
 Also, we are able to gain insight as to why uniform pricing in the wholesale market 
actually increases transaction prices for consumers in the clustered area.  Fundamentally, the 
reason is that uniform wholesale pricing forces the refiner to forgo profits in the corner to be 
competitive in the center.  Thus refiners forced to sell at a uniform price have an incentive to 
keep wholesale prices elevated relative to the central wholesale prices with zone pricing.  This is 
demonstrated in Figure 4, which plots the red refiner’s wholesale price and red retailer’s posted 
price for the center red branded station and the average decision by their counterparts for one 
session.  At the beginning of the session, the red refiner’s price quickly plummets from 231 to 
120 and the red center station (s, a) = (4, 4) eventually follows suit.  The refiner observes that 
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there are substantial profits accruing at the red corner station (s, a) = (6, 6) and in period 176 
raises the wholesale price to 200.  When in period 190 the red center station restocks at the new 
wholesale price of 200, the station owner is forced to raise the center station’s retail price.  The 
red retailer maintains a high price at the center location because it cannot compete with the other 
central stations which have average retail prices below the red retailer’s wholesale price.  As the 
red station will not sell these higher-cost units, competition in the center is weakened.  When a 
second refiner boosts his wholesale price causing a second retailer to raise his center station’s 
price, gradually the prices of the other refiners and stations drift upwards.  The end result is that 
uniform pricing at the wholesale level halts retail competition in the clustered center.   In another 
session, it only takes one refiner’s unilateral action to initiate this process of mitigating 
competition.   
Our second finding considers the effect of mandating uniform wholesale pricing on buyer 
utility.  The ability to collect direct measures of consumer welfare and conduct this analysis is 
another major benefit of a laboratory study over a field study where such measures cannot be 
collected.  Again, we use a linear mixed-effects model to estimate the quantitative effects of the 
treatment (Zone vs. Uniform Pricing) on buyer utility.  We classify each buyer as one of three 
types: interior, equidistant, and periphery.  Interior buyers are those closest to the center stations.  
These buyers originate at one of the following intersections: (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5), (3, 4), or (5, 4).  
A buyer is equidistant from the center stations and at least one corner station if it originates at (4, 
1), (4, 2), (4, 6), (4, 7), (1, 4), (2, 4), (6, 4), (7, 4), (3, 3), (3, 5), (5, 3) or (5, 5).  All other buyers 
are relatively isolated, being located closer to a corner station, and are categorized as periphery 
buyers.  The treatment effect, buyer types (Interior, Equidistant, and Periphery) and interaction 
effects are modeled as zero-one fixed effects.  The sessions are again treated as random effects, 
ei, so that the model we estimate is 
ittiti
ttiiit
PeripheryUniformttanEquidisUniform                         
Periphery ttanEquidisUniformetyBuyerUtili
εββ
βββμ
+×+×
+++++=
54
321
 
where ),0(~ 21σNei and ),0(~
2
,2 iit N σε .  The sessions are indexed by i and the repeated periods 
by t (e.g., t = 301, 302, …, 600).  BuyerUtilityit is the utility that the buyer achieved in the 
market.  We also include heteroskedastic errors by session in the maximum likelihood estimation 
of the model. 
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Finding 2:  Uniform pricing in the wholesale market decreases buyer welfare for the interior 
and equidistant buyers, but has no significant effect on periphery buyers. 
 
Evidence:  In the interest of brevity we report the quantitative support only in the text of this 
finding.  The average buyer utility for interior buyers with zone pricing is μ̂   = 101.58 but with 
uniform wholesale pricing, buyer welfare drops by 1β̂−   = 17.15, a 16.9% decrease that is 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.0491).  With zone pricing, equidistant buyers are worse off 
than interior buyers because they have further to travel to the lower-price center stations ( 2β̂ = –
17.45, p-value = 0.0000). However, with uniform wholesale pricing, the welfare for these buyers 
is even lower than equidistant buyers in the zone pricing treatment ( 41 ˆˆ ββ + = –15.01, p-value = 
0.0549). The point estimates indicate that periphery buyers are harmed by uniform pricing 
( 51 ˆˆ ββ +  = –10.05), but this effect is statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.1555).  
 These first two findings directly counter the claims that zone pricing harms consumers 
and that uniform pricing would benefit consumers.  Uniform pricing in the wholesale market 
raises the actual prices that consumers pay and reduces the welfare to all buyers except those on 
the periphery.  Our next finding reports the impact of uniform wholesale pricing on station and 
refiner profits. 
Finding 3:  Uniform pricing significantly increases station profits, but has no effect on refiner 
profits. 
 
Evidence:  The average station owner earns profits of 801 with zone pricing and 2304 with 
uniform pricing.  For the quantitative support for this finding, we use a Wilcoxon rank sum test 
to compare the total station owner profits of the four zone pricing sessions with the total station 
owner profits of the four uniform sessions. We reject the null hypothesis of equal station owner 
profits with a two-sided test (W = 26, n = 4, m = 4, p-value = 0.0286).  Average refiner profits 
are slightly lower with uniform pricing, 2616 versus 3006 with zone pricing, but a Wilcoxon 
rank sum test indicates that this difference is not statistically significant (W = 17, n = 4, m = 4, p-
value = 0.8857).  
 In sum, we find that uniform wholesale pricing (a) reduces consumer welfare by 
increasing the prices that buyers pay at the clustered stations, relative to retail prices under zone 
pricing, (b) has no statistical effect on consumer welfare and prices for buyers that are in isolated 
areas, (c) increases station owner profits, and (d) has no statistical effect on refiner profits. 
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5.1.2 Zone Pricing (Lessee Dealers) versus Company-owned Stations 
The effects of vertical integration are also rather striking.  Figure 5 displays histograms of 
the posted retail prices.  The mode for the corner stations is 200 in both the zone and company-
owned treatments; however, there is considerably more mass in the left tail of the company-
owned treatments.  The effect of vertical integration on retail prices is considerably more 
conspicuous at the center stations.  The entire distribution of posted prices shifts to the left with 
company-owned stations.  The mode with lessee dealers is only 120, whereas the mode is 150 
under zone pricing with lessee dealers. 
For our quantitative analysis, we estimate a linear mixed-effects model for transaction 
prices.  The treatment effect (Lessee Dealers with Zone Pricing vs. Company-Owned Stations) 
and location effect (Center vs. Corner station) and an interaction effect are modeled as zero-one 
fixed effects, while the 8 independent sessions and the 4 retailers within each session are 
modeled as random effects. 
Finding 4:  Retail transaction prices with company-owned stations are statistically lower in both 
the clustered area and the isolated areas than in the zone pricing treatment. 
 
Evidence:  The mixed effects estimation results presented in Table 2 provide the quantitative 
support for this finding.  With company-owned stations, the average retail transaction price is 
1
ˆˆ βμ +   = 130.22 at a station in the center, which is 13.2% lower than transaction prices with 
lessee dealers ( μ̂  = 149.97).  This effect is statistically significant ( 1β̂  = -19.75, p-value = 
0.0157).  In isolated areas, transaction prices with company-owned stations are -( 31 ˆˆ ββ + ) = 
31.53 less than transaction prices with lessee dealers.  This effect is also statistically significant 
(p-value = 0.0022), reducing transaction prices by 16.5% from a level of 21 ˆˆ βμ + = 191.58 with 
lessee dealers to 3211 ˆˆˆˆ βββμ +++ = 160.04 with company-owned stations.  
Finding 4 reports the extent to which a double markup by refiners and stations raises the 
prices that consumers pay vis-à-vis a single markup by company-owned stations. This finding 
complements the field studies of Barron and Umbeck (1984) and Vita (2000) and a laboratory 
study by Durham (2000), which also find that prices are lower with vertical integration than 
without.  Our next finding quantifies the additional utility buyers receive from eliminating the 
double markup with company-owned stations. 
 
 17
Finding 5:  Relative to the zone pricing treatment, pricing with company-owned stations 
increases buyer welfare for all types of buyers: interior, equidistant, and periphery. 
 
Evidence:  Again, in the interest of brevity we report the quantitative support in the text of this 
finding. With company-owned stations, the utility of interior and equidistant buyers increases by 
1β̂   = 20.45 (p-value = 0.0241).  (The point estimate for equidistant buyers, 4β̂ , is small and 
insignificant, p-value = 0.4940.) The utility of periphery buyers increases by 51 ˆˆ ββ +   = 25.94 (p-
value = 0.0084). These absolute increases in buyer welfare translate into percentage increases of 
20.1%, 24.4%, and 50.6% in buyer welfare for the interior, equidistant, and periphery buyers, 
respectively.  
 
5.2 Dynamic Adjustments with Nonstationary Wholesale Costs 
 We now turn our attention to how prices dynamically adjust to nonstationary costs.  In 
this subsection we investigate how retail prices adjust to changes in station costs.  In particular, 
we investigate whether station prices respond symmetrically or adjust faster to cost increases 
than to decreases.   
As a first step, we must determine whether a long run relationship exists between station 
prices pt and costs ct (wholesale prices).28  If both pt and ct are nonstationary with a unit root, i.e., 
integrated of order 1, I(1), then we can operationalize the hypothesis of a long run (equilibrium) 
relationship between pt and ct using the concept of cointegration developed by Engle and 
Granger (1987).  Station prices and costs are said to be cointegrated if a linear combination of the 
two series is stationary, I(0).  If pt and ct have a long run equilibrium relationship, then the short 
run dynamics of the cointegrated system also have an error-correction representation. An error-
correction model of the first differences (Δpt and Δct) includes a term that reflects the current 
“error” in the levels of pt and ct in achieving long-run equilibrium.  To test whether prices adjust 
asymmetrically or symmetrically to changes in cost, we follow Granger and Lee (1989) in 
estimating a non-symmetric error correction model, namely, 
tttttt zzpcp ξφφαα +++Δ+Δ=Δ
+
−−−− 12111211 , 
                                                 
28 For ease of exposition we are dropping the location, retailer identity, and brand subscripts from per period prices 
and costs.    
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where ),0(~ 2σξ Nt , zt-1 is the error-correction term, and )0 ,max( 11 −
+
− = tt zz . If prices adjust 
symmetrically, the speed of the adjustment to the long run equilibrium is captured 
by 01 1 <<− φ , with .02 =φ   If prices respond faster to cost increases than decreases, then 
01 1 <<− φ  and 02 >φ . 
 We begin this analysis by considering station prices and costs averaged across all 
sessions and subjects for each station location (corner and center) and treatment (zone, uniform, 
and company-owned). Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests fail to reject the null hypothesis for all 
series.  Given that the each of series are found to be I(1), we now consider whether a long run 
equilibrium exists between prices and costs for each location in each treatment.  This is our sixth 
finding. 
Finding 6:  With zone wholesale pricing and company-owned retail pricing, a long run 
relationship exists between station prices and station costs for both center and corner stations; 
however no such relationships exist with uniform pricing.  
 
Evidence:  The results of Johansen cointegration tests serve as the qualitative support for this 
finding.29  Likelihood ratio (LR) tests of the number of cointegrating equations indicate that there 
is 1 cointegrating equation at the 1% level of significance for both corner and center stations with 
zone wholesale pricing and that there is 1 cointegrating equation at the 5% level of significance 
for both corner and center stations with company-owned retail pricing.   However, the LR tests 
reject any cointegration with uniform pricing at the 5% level of significance for either locale.  
Finding 6 indicates that a long run equilibrium between station prices and costs with zone 
wholesale pricing and with company-owned retail pricing.  Shocks to costs, both positive and 
negative, are passed-through to customers via changes in station prices according to a stable long 
run relationship between the two series.  In contrast, we find that uniform wholesale pricing 
breaks down the long run relationship between costs and prices at both center and corner 
stations. This means that any relationship implied by a regression of prices on costs in levels is 
spurious.  Changes in costs still may lead to changes in prices, but there is no short run 
adjustment of prices toward a long run relationship with costs when costs experience a shock. 
Uniform pricing purges the responsiveness of retail prices to cost changes, the negative 
implication being that when wholesale costs fall, retail prices do not follow. This also means that 
                                                 
29 Schwarz criteria indicate that a one period lag is superior to any other lag specification from two to thirty.  The 
test assumption also assumes no deterministic trend in the data since none was included in the induced wholesale 
costs. 
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retail prices are insulated to increases in wholesale costs, but we also observe in Finding 2 that 
uniform wholesale pricing generates high retail prices in the clustered area. 
Our seventh finding addresses the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon in the retail 
gasoline industry with zone wholesale pricing (7a) and company-owned retail pricing (7b), 
where a long run equilibrium relationship exists. 
Finding 7a:  Station prices in the clustered area adjust quickly and asymmetrically to changes in 
costs with zone pricing.  Station prices in isolated areas adjust more slowly, but symmetrically to 
changes in costs.   
 
Evidence:  For the sake of brevity, we report the estimates of the error-correction model in the 
text of the finding.  First, we report that the error-correction term is highly significant and is 
largely responsible for explaining the adjustment of prices (p-value < 0.0001 for both center and 
corner stations).  When the error-correction term is positive (i.e., costs are lower relative to what 
is specified in the long run equilibrium given prices), the speed of adjustment for center stations 
is considerably slower ( 21 ˆˆ φφ + = -0.176 + 0.128 = -.048) than when error-correction term is 
negative ( 1̂φ = -0.176).  For the center stations, impulse response functions indicate that over 90% 
of an increase in costs is reflected in the price in just 11 periods (or just 18.7 seconds of 
experiment time), but in the same amount of time only 40% of a decrease in costs is passed-
through. In fact, it takes 45 periods (or 76.5 seconds) for 90% of a cost decrease to be reflected in 
the price at center stations. The speed of adjustment for corner stations is slower than for center 
stations ( 1̂φ = -0.047) and is symmetric ( 2̂φ is statistically insignificant with a p-value = 
0.1650).  
Finding 7b:  With company-owned retail pricing, station prices adjust symmetrically and much 
more slowly to changes in station costs. 
  
Evidence:  The error-correction term 1̂φ  is significant for both center and corner stations (p-value 
= 0.0001 and 0.0353, respectively), but 2̂φ  is statistically insignificant (p-values = 0.9522 and 
0.7719).  For the center stations, 90% of an increase in costs is reflected in the price in 123 
periods, and at corner stations it takes 152 periods for 90% of a cost increase to be reflected in 
the price.  
Having found at an aggregate level that prices adjust asymmetrically at the center stations 
with zone wholesale pricing, we continue to exploit our dataset to investigate asymmetric price 
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responses to costs.  First, we estimate error-correction models for the center stations at the 
session level and then for each individual station owner in each of the four zone pricing 
sessions.30  In the interest of brevity, we focus on the estimates at the session level but only 
classify the individual station owners by whether 2̂φ  is (a) statistically positive, (b) statistically 
not different than zero, (c) statistically negative, or by (d) not having cointegrated prices and 
costs. 
Finding 8:  At the session level, station prices in the clustered area adjust asymmetrically to 
changes in costs with zone pricing.  Individual station owners are predominantly and equally 
classified as one of two behavioral types: asymmetric and symmetric adjusters.  
 
Evidence:  In three of the four sessions, the error-correction model indicates that prices rise faster 
than they fall in response to cost changes ( 2̂φ > 0 with p-values = 0.0051, 0.0740, and 0.0000). In 
the fourth session, prices actually fall faster than they rise ( 2̂φ < 0 with p-value = 0.0107).  The 
three sessions that adjust faster to cost increases include 3, 1, 2 subjects, respectively, who are 
classified as an asymmetric adjuster ( 2̂φ is statistically greater than 0).  The fourth session 
contains three symmetric adjusters and one station owner who decreases prices faster than he 
increases them in response to cost changes. Of the 16 station owners, 6 respond faster to cost 
increases than to decreases and 6 respond symmetrically.  
Finding 8 is important in that it reveals that only a minority of firms need to adjust prices 
asymmetrically to generate the overall effect that we report in Finding 7a.  This raises the 
important qualification for field studies that employ price indices, for as few as just one out of 
four firms can generate a rockets and feathers pricing pattern at an industry level.    
 
6.  Conclusion 
 The gasoline industry is an intricate system, making the implications of policies such as 
prohibiting zone pricing and vertical integration unclear from anecdotal evidence alone.  
However, such topics are regularly debated in the political arena.  Consumers and media 
routinely scrutinize retail gasoline prices looking for evidence of anticompetitive behavior.  The 
sheer magnitude and social interest in this market has led numerous research studies of the 
                                                 
30 Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for all series fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, and unless otherwise 
noted, Johansen cointegration tests indicate that all pairs of price and cost series are cointegrated.  The Schwarz 
criteria also continue to indicate that 1 lag is superior to any other lag specification. 
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industry.  Unfortunately, this field research must rely on incomplete information.  In this study 
we detail a laboratory investigation of the gasoline industry, focusing specifically on uniform 
pricing at the wholesale level, divorcement, and asymmetric retail price responses to cost shocks.              
 Our study provides a series of insights into the effect of zone pricing.  In many situations 
our results provide support for hypotheses formalized by previous researchers.  First, prices in 
relatively isolated areas are higher than prices in areas with a clustering of stations.  Contrary to 
the claims expressed by proponents of uniform pricing legislation, uniform wholesale pricing 
actually increases prices in the more competitive area and simultaneously does not alter prices in 
more isolated geographic areas that are less competitive.  Due to this behavior, uniform pricing 
actually reduces the welfare of buyers who are closest to the center area, as well as those who are 
on the border of the center and isolated areas.  The buyer losses are not the refiners’ gains.  In 
fact we find that refiners’ profits are unaffected by the uniform pricing.  Instead, it is the retailers 
that are extracting surplus from the consumers.  The data offer a simple explanation for this 
result.  Under uniform pricing, the refiners offer a price that is above the center area zone 
wholesale price and below the isolated area zone wholesale price.  These refiners are balancing 
extracting economic rents from the isolated stations and remaining viable in the competitive, 
center area.  Thus, a refiner’s gains in the center area, due to higher wholesale prices, are offset 
by reduced earnings in the isolated markets where wholesale prices have decreased and profits 
are unchanged.  With uniform pricing the retailers do not gain a profit margin in the center area 
but do receive a larger margin in the isolated regions where retail prices are unchanged but 
wholesale prices have declined. 
 On the issue of divorcement we find that company-owned stations eliminate the double 
markup of prices. From this we can conclude that divorcement legislation harms consumers.  All 
buyers, in clustered or isolated areas, pay lower prices and have substantially higher utility when 
stations are company-owned.  This price finding in the laboratory (buyer utility cannot be 
directly measured in field studies) affirms the results from field studies, lending some credence 
to our other findings. 
  Numerous studies have demonstrated an asymmetry in gasoline price responses.  In the 
laboratory we are able to investigate this pattern while controlling for collusion, menu costs, and 
buyer search.  With zone pricing, the practice in place when previous studies evaluated 
asymmetric price responses, we find that retail prices and retail costs are cointegrated, i.e., a long 
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term equilibrium relationship exists between the two series.  Our data indicate that prices in the 
center area adjust more quickly to costs increases than to cost decreases, but we find that in 
isolated areas price responses are symmetric.  At the market (session) level we find that 
responses are influenced by the idiosyncrasies of individual retailers, some of whom respond 
symmetrically and some of whom respond asymmetrically.  Further, a retailer’s type is not 
correlated with the volatility of its wholesaler’s prices.  However, retailers who observe more 
volatile wholesale prices during periods of increasing wholesale costs (or world oil prices) are 
more likely to respond asymmetrically.  With company-owned stations, prices adjust 
symmetrically to cost shocks.  Further, this response is substantially slower in the company-
owned treatment than with zone pricing.    
 In addition to benefiting retailers at the expense of consumers, another effect of uniform 
pricing is the destruction of the long term relationship between retail prices and costs.  Formally, 
we find that with uniform wholesale pricing, retail costs and prices are not cointegrated and 
therefore any reduction in wholesale costs, say due to changes in the world price for oil, would 
not necessarily be reflected in retail prices. 
 As with any empirical study in the field or laboratory, the inherent specificity of a data 
set is determined by such details as the environment and institution.  Like with all empirical 
studies one must take this into account when inferring broader implications from the results.  
Further research would be useful in examining how the exogenous location and number of 
stations, as well as endogenous and costly entry and exit, affect our findings.  Along the lines of 
Shepard (1993), it would also be useful to explore the endogenous formation of vertical 
relationships in laboratory markets, and how the interaction of different vertical relationships 
affects retail competition. 
References 
Bacon, Robert W., “Rockets and Feathers:  The Asymmetric Speed of Adjustment of UK Retail  
Gasoline Prices to Cost Changes.” Energy Economics v13, 1991, pp. 211-8. 
Barron, John M. and Umbeck, John R., “The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The  
Case of Retail Gasoline Markets.” Journal of Law and Economics v27, 1984, pp. 313-28.  
Borenstein, Severin and Shepard, Andrea, “Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets.”   
RAND Journal of Economics v27, 1996, pp. 429-51. 
Borenstein, Severin; Cameron, A. Colin and Gilbert, Richard, “Do Gasoline Prices Respond  
 
 23
Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes?” Quarterly Journal of Economics v112, 
1997, pp. 305-39.  
Bulow, Jeremy; Fischer, Jeffrey; Creswell, Jay and Taylor, Christopher, “U.S. Midwest Gasoline 
Pricing and the Spring 2000 Price Spike.” The Energy Journal, v24 (3), 2003, pp. 121-
149. 
Burtman, Bob. “Paying the Price” SF Weekly, November 29, 2000. Available at 
http://www.sfweekly.com/issues/2000-11-29/feature.html/1/index.html. 
Cason, Timothy and Friedman, Daniel, “A Laboratory Study of Customer Markets.” Advances in 
Economic Analysis & Policy, v2(1), 2002, Article 1. 
Cason, Timothy; Friedman, Daniel, and Milam, Garret. “Bargaining Versus Posted Price 
Competition in Customer Markets.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 
2003, 223-251. 
Castanias, Rick and Johnson, Herb, “Gas Wars: Retail Gasoline Fluctuations.” Review of  
Economics and Statistics v75, 1993, pp. 171-74  
Comanor, William and Riddle, Jon, “The Costs of Regulation:  Branded Open Supply and 
Uniform Pricing of Gasoline.” International Journal of the Economics of Business, v10 
(2), 2003, pp. 123-144.  
Davis, Douglas and Korenok, Oleg, “Posted-Offer Markets in Near Continuous Time:  An 
Experimental Investigation.” Working Paper, Virginia Commonwealth University,  2005. 
Douglas, Elizabeth, “Station Owners Pump Fists at Oil Companies,” L. A. Times, May 7, 2003. 
Durham, Yvonne, “An Experimental Examination of Double Marginalization and Vertical 
Relationships.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, v42 (2), 2000, pp.207-
229. 
Engle, Robert and Granger, Clive, “Co-integration and Error Correction: Representation,  
Estimation, and Testing.” Econometrica v55, 1987, pp. 251-76  
Granger, Clive and Lee, T. H., “Investigation of Production, Sales and Inventory Relationships  
Using Multicointegration and Non-symmetric Error Correction Models.” Journal of 
Applied Econometrics v4, December 1989, pp. S145-59. 
Hastings, Justine, “Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs,”  
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, United States Senate, May 2, 2002a. 
 
 24
Hastings, Justine, “Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets.” 
Working Paper, Dartmouth University, 2002b. 
Isaac, Mark; Oaxaca, Ronald and Reynolds, Stanley, “Competition and Pricing in the Arizona  
Gasoline Market.” working paper, University of Arizona, 1998. 
Johnson, Ronald, “Search Costs, Lags, and Prices at the Pump.” Review of Industrial  
Organization v20, 2002, pp. 33-50.  
Lockyer, Bill. “Report on Gasoline Pricing in California.” Office of the Attorney General of the  
State of California, May 2000.    
Longford, N. T., Random Coefficient Models. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Maskin, Eric and Tirole, Jean, “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked  
Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles.” Econometrica v56, 1988, pp. 571-99.   
Peltzman, Sam, “Prices Rise Faster Than They Fall.” Journal of Political Economy v108, 2000,  
pp. 466-502.  
Reilly, Barry and Witt, Robert, “Petrol Price Asymmetries Revisited.” Energy Economics v20,  
1998, pp. 297-308. 
Rey, Patrick and Stiglitz, Joseph. “The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition.”  
RAND Journal of Economics v26, 1995, pp. 431-51.  
Shepard, Andrea, “Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline  
Retailing.” RAND Journal of Economics v24, 1993, pp. 58-77. 
Slade, Margaret E., “Vancouver’s Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise in Uncovering  
Supergame Strategies.” Review of Economic Studies v59, 1992, pp. 257-76.  
Smith, Vernon L., “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science,” American Economic 
Review v72, 1982, pp. 923-55. 
Smith, Vernon L., “Economics in the Laboratory.” Journal of Economic Perspectives v8, 1994,  
pp. 113-31.  
Vita, Michael G., “Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive  
Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies.” Journal of Regulatory Economics v18, 2000, 
pp. 217-33. 
 
 25
 
Table 1.  Estimates of the Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Transaction Prices: 
Zone vs. Uniform Pricing 
   
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
μ 149.98 4.13 2305 36.30 0.0000 
Uniform (β1) 16.40 5.85 6 2.80 0.0311 
Corner (β2) 41.60 0.75 2305 55.40 0.0000† 
Uniform ×  Corner (β3) -12.11 1.05 2305 -11.56 0.0000 
   2339 Obs.   
   Ha: β1 + β3 ≠ 0 0.4926 
   Ha: β2 + β3 > 0 0.0000
† 
†One-sided test. 
Note: The linear mixed-effects model is estimated by maximum likelihood.  For brevity, the 
session and subject random effects are not included in this table or any others. 
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Figure 1.  Geographic Depiction of the Laboratory Retail Gasoline Market 
Table 2.  Estimates of the Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Transaction Prices: 
Zone Pricing with Lessee Dealers vs. Company-Owned Stations 
   
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
μ 149.97 4.99 2340 30.08 0.0000 
Company-owned (β1) -19.75 7.06 6 -2.80 0.0157† 
Corner (β2) 41.60 0.75 2340 55.40 0.0000† 
Company-owned ×  Corner (β3) -11.78 1.20 2340 -9.81 0.0000 
   2374 Obs.   
   Ha: β1 + β3 < 0 0.0022
† 
   Ha: β2 + β3 > 0 0.0000
† 
†One-sided test. 
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Figure 2. Histograms of Station Posted Prices: Zone vs. Uniform Pricing 
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Figure 5. Histograms of Station Posted Prices: Zone Pricing (Lessee Dealer) vs. Company-Owned Stations
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Appendix: Instructions for “Experimental Gasoline Markets” 
 
Store (Station) Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making.  The instructions are simple.  
If you read them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable 
amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
From this point on, all references are in terms of computer dollars.  There are two types 
of sellers in this experiment: store sellers and supplier sellers. In this experiment you 
will be a store seller for a series of trading periods.  There are 3 other store sellers and 
4 total supplier sellers.  As a store owner you will buy a fictitious good from the 
suppliers and sell it to the computer, who will act as the buyers who purchase the good 
from you.   
 
The stores that you and the other store owners operate are located on the grid 
displayed on your screen.  The upper left portion of the screen indicates which stores 
you will make decisions for. 
 
Notice that the color of your stores is {Insert: blue, green, red, or pink}.  This means 
that you can only buy from a supplier that offers the same color of the fictitious product 
as you.  The suppliers are listed at the top right portion of the screen. 
 
To choose a supplier, click once on the circle in the grid for a store that you operate. 
 
Then click on the supplier from whom you would like to buy the product.  The ‘price’ is 
how much that supplier is willing to sell the product to you. {Uniform Treatment Only: 
The supplier price will be the same for each store of the same color.} {Zone Treatment 
Only: The supplier price can be different for each store.} 
 
At the time you buy from the supplier, you have agreed to purchase 10 units at this 
price from the supplier.  The supplier may lower this price in which case the remaining 
units will be sold at the lower price.  
 
This information will be displayed on the ‘Purchases’ tab.  While you have agreed to buy 
10 units at the supplier’s price, you do not incur the cost for each unit until you have 
sold the unit.  As you sell units to the computer buyers, these rows will be filled in.  We 
will now discuss how you earn profit in the experiment and then how the computer 
buyers purchase. 
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Earnings 
 
You earn profit by selling at a store price greater than your costs.  You have two costs.  
The first cost is the supplier price that you pay the supplier for the units you sell.  The 
second cost is the store cost that you incur for selling each unit.  For example, suppose 
that your price is 180, the supplier price is 140, and the store cost is 10.  Your profit 
from selling one unit at that price is 180 – 140 – 10 = 30.  More generally, your profit is 
 
Profit = Price Received – Supplier cost – Store cost. 
 
If you do not sell a unit, you do not incur either the supplier or store costs. 
 
To set your price at a store, double click on the store circle and submit your desired 
price.  The prices of each store are displayed in the circles on the grid as ‘P = 180’, for 
example.  
 
Buyers 
 
The computer will act as the buyers in this experiment.  Every 1.7 seconds, which we 
will also call a period, a buyer will come to purchase a unit from one of the stores in 
grid.  A car (the buyer) will randomly appear at one of the intersections of the grid.  To 
purchase from a store, the buyer must travel to an intersection where a store is 
located.  Before traveling, the maximum value the buyer is willing to pay for a unit is 
240.  This maximum value falls more and more the further a buyer must travel to 
purchase from a store.   
 
More Information on the Buyers 
 
There are five types of buyers.  A grey buyer receives an additional value of 0 from 
purchasing from any colored store. 
 
A blue buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a blue store.  In 
other words, if a blue buyer purchases from a blue store, the most the buyer is willing 
to pay is 265. If a blue buyer purchases from any other colored store, the most that 
same buyer is willing to pay is 240.   
 
Similarly, a red buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a red 
store; a green buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a green 
store; and a pink buyer will buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing 
from a pink store. 
 
On average, 20% of buyers are grey, 20% are blue, 20% are red, 20% are green, and 
20% are pink.        
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Finally, each buyer will purchase from the store that yields it the greatest difference 
between the price it must pay at the store and its value after traveling to it.  If the price 
is greater than a buyer’s value at all stores, then the buyer will not purchase from any 
store. 
 
Summary 
 
You can change your store price at any time by double clicking on the circle and 
submitting your new price.   
 
You can change your supplier by clicking once on your store and then choosing the 
supplier from the upper right portion of your screen.  Please note that some stores may 
not have a choice of suppliers.  A new choice of supplier will not go into effect until you 
have sold all of the 10 units, as displayed on the ‘Purchases’ tab. 
 
History 
 
The ‘Purchases’ tab displays a history of all of your sales to the buyers and your profit 
per unit. The upper left portion of the ‘City Grid’ tab shows your total cumulative profit. 
 
This is the end of the instructions.  If you have any questions, please raise your hand 
and a monitor will come by to answer your question.  Your earnings in the experiment 
will be converted into cash at the rate of 800 computer dollars for 1 U.S. dollar.  If 
you are ready to proceed into the market, click on the ‘Start’ button. 
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Supplier (Refiner) Instructions 
 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making.  The instructions are simple.  
If you read them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable 
amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
From this point on, all references are in terms of computer dollars.  There are two types 
of sellers in this experiment: store sellers and supplier sellers. In this experiment you 
will be a supplier seller for a series of trading periods.  There are 3 other suppliers and 
4 total store sellers.  As a supplier you will sell a fictitious good to the store sellers, who 
in turn sell it to buyers.  The computer will act as the buyers in the experiment.   
 
The stores are located on the grid and displayed as circles on your screen.  The building 
icon on the top part of the screen represents you as a supplier.  
 
Notice that the stores and your supplier icon have different colors.  In particular, your 
supplier color is {Insert: blue, green, red, or pink}.   
 
Stores will choose a supplier from whom they will purchase.  The ‘price’ is how much 
you are willing to sell the product to a store.  {Uniform Treatment only: The price you 
set will be the same for each store of the same color.} {Zone Treatment only: The price 
you set can be different for each store.} 
 
A store decides to purchase 10 units at a time at the price you have set.  If you lower 
this price, the remaining units will be sold at the lower price. You earn the profit from 
those sales only if the store can resell the unit to a buyer (the computer).  You earn 
profit by selling at a price greater than your cost.  For example, suppose that your price 
is 140 and your cost per unit is 110.  Your profit from selling one unit at that price is 
140 – 110 = 30.  More generally, your profit is 
 
Your Profit = Price Received  – Cost. 
 
 
How Stores Earn Profits 
 
Stores earn profit by selling at a store price greater than their costs.  Stores have two 
costs.  The first cost is the supplier price that you set.  The second cost is the store cost 
that you do not know. For example, suppose that the store sets a price of 180, your 
supplier price is 140, and the store cost is 10.  The store’s profit from selling one unit is 
180 – 140 – 10 = 30.  More generally, a store’s profit is 
 
Store Profit = Price Paid by Buyer – Supplier Price You Set – Store cost. 
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The prices of each store are displayed in the circles as ‘P = 180’, for example.  
 
You only receive a profit if a store sells a unit to a buyer.  If a store does not sell a unit, 
you do not earn profit. Your profit is updated every 10 periods and is displayed in the 
upper left portion of your screen. 
 
Buyers 
 
The computer will act as the buyers in this experiment.  Every 1.7 seconds, which we 
will also call a period, a buyer will come to purchase a unit from one of the stores in 
grid.  A car (the buyer) will randomly appear at one of the intersections of the grid.  To 
purchase from a store, the buyer must travel to an intersection where a store is 
located.  Before traveling, the maximum value the buyer is willing to pay for a unit is 
240.  This maximum value falls more and more the further a buyer must travel to 
purchase from a store.   
 
More Information the Buyers 
 
There are five types of buyers.  A grey buyer receives an additional value of 0 from 
purchasing from any colored store. 
 
A blue buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a blue store.  In 
other words, if a blue buyer purchases from a blue store, the most the buyer is willing 
to pay is 265. If a blue buyer purchases from any other colored store, the most that 
same buyer is willing to pay is 240.   
 
Similarly, a red buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a red 
store; a green buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing from a green 
store; and a pink buyer will buyer will receive additional value of 25 from purchasing 
from a pink store. 
 
On average, 20% of buyers are grey, 20% are blue, 20% are red, 20% are green, and 
20% are pink.        
 
Finally, each buyer will purchase from the store that yields it the greatest difference 
between the price it must pay at the store and its value after traveling to it.  If the price 
is greater than a buyer’s value at all stores, then the buyer will not purchase from any 
store. 
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Summary 
 
You can change your supplier prices at any time by double clicking on the supplier icon 
and submitting your new prices.  Once this price has been confirmed any store that 
purchases from you will pay you that price when it, in turn, sells the good to a buyer.  
Recall that you only receive a profit if your store sells a unit to a buyer.   
 
History 
 
This is the end of the instructions.  If you have any questions, please raise your hand 
and a monitor will come by to answer your question.  Your earnings in the experiment 
will be converted into cash at the rate of 800 computer dollars for 1 U.S. dollar.  If 
you are ready to proceed into the market, click on the ‘Start’ button. 
 
 
